>1. At least read Veracrypt documentation before writing guides about how to use Veracrypt. Hidden Volumes are detectable on devices that utilize wear-leveling. yea i forgot to mention that detail, will note in my tutorials to not trust ssds for the same, and prefer HDDs >2. You recommend backing up files with hidden volumes to cloud but changing a few things in the hidden partition before. If the cloud provider secretly keeps versions you will lose all plausible deniability after you upload the container second time. I shoudl've already address this in the tutorial you mentioned, maybe badly formulated it http://blog.nihilhfjmj55gfbleupwl2ub7lvbhq4kkoioatiopahfqwkcnglsawyd.onion/servers/plausiblydeniabledataprotection/index.html "goal is that for each veracrypt hidden volume changes that occur, the content of the decoy partition must also change because otherwise it will reveal the existance of the hidden volume if the remote server keeps the previous versions of each file." meaning the decoy partition must justify the overall volume changes >3. The entire "Shifting from a public to an Anonymous online persona". agreed it's a preety incomplete tutorial i'll have to go back over and update. Why isn't just going through KYC-free services with tor and monero alone to simulate a "i've sold my services to someone else, since that date" enough to justify you no longer own the service ? of course as mentionned in there, idea is to operate the services only from the whonix VMs in the plausibly deniable partition, if you can't prove those VMs exist, then you can't prove that you are still the owner of the services right ? of course i'm assuming in this case that whoever does this is innocent until proven guilty. >4. Hosting public Tor services from home. Be smart and don't host public (and legally questionable) services from your own network. what do you recommend then ? hosting tor services from your friend's house ? trusting a cloud provider to run a sensitive service, (putting himself and his business at risk in the process) and to not snitch ? Of course i know how to acquire a server anonymously and use it anonymously, but i'm also looking at the longevity of the service here. would be interested in hearing what other threat vectors you identified when running an onion service from home.

love yEd, minimalistic software, all that's needed to make simple or complex graphs

Care to elaborate what trouble there is exactly ? i could mention that the server should sit behind a pfsense router (open source router to avoid any ISP spying on the local network) as for why running a server at home, i mean who hasn't heard of cloud providers reporting to the authorities that some sensitive service is running on their rented server? I definitely would consider running some sensitive service at home rather than having to trust a cloud provider to keep a service hidden given that they will most likely comply with any request from authorities

>I would not use email, if you wanted any sort of real time notifications your email client would have to be online permanently and email has some opsec risks. should be online 24/7 if you use a remote mail server, care to elaborate what opsec risks are there exactly ? let's assume you use either of that smtp mailserver setup (as mentionned in the tutorial) : http://blog.nihilhfjmj55gfbleupwl2ub7lvbhq4kkoioatiopahfqwkcnglsawyd.onion/servers/mailprivate/index.html >Also, the emergency shutdown, data should be wiped not just volume deletes. the whole point is that it's only closing the veracrypt hidden volume, since at rest without having it opened, it should be impossible to prove that there is a hidden volume. Feel free to correct me if i'm wrong though, but so far i didn't find any articles detailing that it's possible to prove the existance of a veracrypt hidden volume > You may be reasonably safe with the encrypted volumes I do not know. Plus ssd drives, deleted data is still there but just marked as deleted? Use old fashioned wipeable hard disk drives though they take forever to wipe. True i should mention in the tutorial that HDDs are to be preferred, however again, i don't see the point of deleting any data if it's still impossible to prove the existance of a hidden VC volume at rest >I do feel a bit uncomfortable replying to this seeing a hostname Wonderland in the tutorial terminal. i don't see an issue, but i can change the hostname to something else if you want :)

About email, you could use a messaging protocol for real time alerts eg xmpp or SimpleX (smp-message) which would save having your own email setup. I missed your tutorial suggestion about using hdd's instead of ssd. My bad. I know how hidden volumes in veracrypt work and yes there is plausible deniability but should your server get raided, the elaborate security layers you implemented would suggest you have alot to hide. I hear your reason for running the server at home as you can't trust server providers to give them up to LEA and the servers have local access to anyone in the data center. My only suggestion might to distribute the server over several sites so you don't have a single point of failure <- something I have been thinking about how to implement but not got very far. Re. running your own router at home, definitely. I have been running my own ever since I hacked all the routers in my providers accessible subnet and printed warning messages on any printers I could find!

>If you're running the onion from real estate tied to your identity or your associates' identities, you've already lost. what do you recommend in that case ? (same question for /u/LondonKnives) >For unattended systems, it's worth drilling/filling any ports and installing circuitry that destroys all memory/storage devices if something is plugged in. interesting idea, but sounds very complex to me, unless if you know of a simple way of implementing it

should be fine actually, maybe try with a new torbrowser identity/circuit ?

Tried 2 times Edit: it's working now